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Over several decades, plenty of records of lab. workers contracting disease due to the infectious materials have 
been documented. About 80 percent of these cases are thought to be directly associated with the formation of aerosols 
during the lab. works with potentially infectious samples. Small liquid or solid particles of aerosols suspended in the 
air for a while or spread over a wide range of distances and then inhaled easily. However, they can be settled rapidly 
on surfaces such as skin and ventilation systems if the diameters of particles are higher than 5 microns. Effective steps 
should regularly be used to protect staff and the environment, or to reduce the extent of the aerosols production. 
Measures containing the aerosol are to be applied where physical containment at practice 2(P2) and above levels is 
needed for the research operation. 
In most cases the safely equipment’s and precautions must be available in all time in the lab. and comply with 
the required level of Biosafety for any type of the laboratory work (including the relevant biological agents, SARS-
CoV-2 in this case). Staff who working with suspected or confirmed specimens of COVID-19 or of SARS-CoV-2 
should be completely protected from such infectious materials. Good biosafety practices have been recognized to 
avoid or mitigate the spread of infection (i.e., SARS-CoV-2). Standard precautions expected to be already used by 
laboratories as stated in the general guidelines and they should follow standard laboratory practices. Practices related 
with these biosafety requirements must be proceed when dealing with samples/specimens from SARS-CoV-2. This 
involves microbiological as well as clinical laboratories conducting routine serum, blood, sputum (respiratory) and 
other sample diagnostic, analytical, or other research-related studies. 
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Biological safety/ Overview 
Safety in biological aspects introduces general surveillance beyond activities that including 
biohazardous agents, monitoring and assessment of containment systems efficiency and 
maintenance. It provides advice and assistance on the processing and shipment of biohazardous 
agents as well as consulting services on some issues concerning biological safety. 
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Several researchers have conducted experiments in some infections spreading within the 
workers in laboratories of microbiology during the past half-century[1-3]and have distinguished a 
variety of possible pathogens that are obviously more common than other causative agents within 
these laboratories. These pathogens are usually falling among viruses, bacteria, rickettsiae, and 
fungi. In order to reduce the risk of infection, knowledge related with those organisms, with a high 
potential to invade normal humans, can contribute to choose of adequate precautions. The risk of 
laboratory staff being exposed can be reduced by using safely lab.tools. The initial purpose of 
disinfectant is to manage aerosols, but proper and safe equipment can effectively be used in a wider 
context to separate the worker in biology laboratories from the hazardous or infectious substance, 
that being processed[4].  
Laboratory workers must treat the material properly according to specified standards. 
Containment levels vary from the lowest level (1) of biosafety until(4). In the USA, certain levels 
have been defined by the Disease Control and Prevention Centers. The same biosafety levels are 
specified in the EU in the Directive. Four biosafety levels (BSLs) that usually apply to biological 
materials are included in these requirements. Laboratory workers assumed to be intensively trained 
in a certain range of skills for handling potentially hazardous materials, depending on the 
 level[5, 6].  
 
Aerosol Generation during Laboratory Procedures 
The greatest possible risk for contamination is aerosols forming during normal laboratory 
procedures such as pipetting, mixing, and centrifuging. Laboratory procedures that could produce 
maximum levels of aerosols, ex. centrifugation as well as homogenization, have been reported[7, 
8].Liquid or dry particles of aerosol can either 5 micron or less in diameter and we assume that 
they released through several standard processes in lab. These fine particles do not settle down 
easily and might be spreading through a ventilation system, or instead of transported by air currents 
over long distances. Aerosol particles are derived to the lungs alveoli if inhaled. On the other hands 
droplets more than 5 micron stay briefly on air and are non-breathable. Droplets tend to settle 
rapidly on inanimate surfaces because of their density or may be accumulated particularly in top 
part of the respiratory tract within skin or mucous layer. Droplet, clothing as well as lab. tools can 
directly or indirectly seek high risk of infection to the skin, eye mucosal membrane, nose and 
mouth, [9].Primary and secondary barriers to mitigate the possibility of accidental bio aerosol 
infection (i.e. centrifuge rotors and homogenizers contained) have been developed for protection 
measures. For example, a biosafety cabinet (BSC) could be a primary barrier. An autoclave (BSL-
2) may be a secondary barrier, or an installation within a facility like a dedicated anteroom or 
ventilation device could act as the barrier in a higher-level situation. Special training may be 
required to deal with these infectious products, depending on the safety requirements in place. It 
is the responsibility of the laboratory supervisor to correctly training laboratory staff[5, 7]. 
Biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) 
The lowest safety standard for biological material handling is BSL-1. This form of substance 
poses no or only a low risk to healthy adult people and presents limited possible risk to laboratory 
workers and the community. It contains many types of infectious, non- infectious bacteria and 
viruses, such as canine hepatitis, varicella (chicken pox), E. coli, as well as particular cell cultures. 
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Within laboratory, biological staff are able to carry out their experiments on open bench tops, and 
it’s not necessary to use special equipment. Normal microbiology procedures are typically 
adequate to protect laboratory staff and employer in other buildings, for example, since no mouth 
pipetting is permitted, and all work surfaces should be decontaminated once work is completed. 
Any food stuff and smoking are not permitted. Workers normally wear lab coat, eye protection as 
well as gloves[2,4,10].  
 
 
Biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) 
Higher security standards are required for all activities in a BSL-2 laboratory than in a BSL-
1 laboratory. It involves numerous microorganisms (ex. viruses and bacterial cells) that can result 
mild illnesses or are not easily reduced by lab. setting, such as influenza A, measles, hepatitis 
A, B, and C, dengue fever, Lyme disease, Salmonella, mumps, Bacillus subtilis, etc. Due to 
their ability to cause human illness, great caution must be taken to avoid percutaneous injury, and 
if necessary, workers are subject to regular medical supervision. A BSC would be used by workers 
in a BSL-2 laboratory as a key barrier for potentially dangerous aerosols. During normal work 
processes such as mixing, pipetting, and centrifuging, these aerosols are usually created, so these 
activities should be performed under a BSC. It is important to take special precautions with sharps 
that can cause injury and to limit access to BSL-2 laboratories[10, 11].  
Biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) 
This level is concerning with the production, education, clinical, diagnosis, research facilities 
in which procedures are performed with indigenous or exogenous materials that can be after 
inhalation leads to serious or potentially fatal disease. It contains different bacteria and viruses that 
can introduce severe, lethal diseases in humans, but for which there are vaccines or other therapies, 
such as Bacillus anthracis,  SARS corona virus, Hendra virus, Salmonella typhi, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis Coxiella  burnetii, Rift Valley fever virus, Rickettsia rickettsia, 
and yellow fever virus[12, 13].Laboratories for BSL-3 are constructed to be quickly 
decontaminate. Moreover, these laboratories should use regulated or "directional" air flow to 
ensure that air current passed from outside the lab. (such as hallways) to the laboratory areas. Two 
self-closing, or interlocked, doors, sealed windows and wall surfaces, and filtered ventilation 
systems are other engineered safety features. Depending on the biological risk assessment, In 
addition, BSL-3 laboratories should have access to decontaminate equipment for waste materials, 
for example an incinerator, an autoclave, or any other procedures.. Relevant instruction in the 
handling of pathogenic and potentially lethal agents is given to laboratory users and is supervised 
by competent scientists who are skilled in working with such agents. This is called a warm or 
neutral environment[14]. 
Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) 
BSL-4 requires the handling of very hazardous and exotic biological materials that, as 
a result of aerosols, can cause infection within the laboratory. In dealing with biological 
hazards at this point, the use of a Hazmat suit and a self-contained oxygen supply is 
mandatory. There will be several toilets, A vacuum room, an ultraviolet light room and other 
protection measures intended to remove any biohazard traces at the entrance and exit of the 
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bio lab level 4. Several airlocks are used which are electronically Locked to prevent the 
simultaneous opening of both doors. Both air and water facilities going to and coming from 
a level 4 biosafety laboratory will undergo similar decontamination processes to minimize 
the risk of accidental release [9, 12]. 
 At this level, agents with an antigenic relationship close to or equivalent to Biosafety 
Level 4 agents are handled until sufficient data is collected, either to validate continuing 
work at this level or to collaborate with them at a lower level. The BSL 4 laboratory should 
have a Class III biological safety cabinet in combination with a positive-pressure, air-
supplied full-body suit, but can use a Class I or II BSC. BSL 4 laboratories are typically 
housed in separate buildings or a completely isolated, dedicated supply and exhaust 
ventilation area, serving as a second barrier. Exhaust streams are filtered through high -
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters,[15, 16]depending on the agents used. 
 
laboratories providing coronavirus SARS-CoV-2/(COVID-19) diagnosis 
Coronaviruses are non-segmented positive-sense RNA enveloped viruses which are 
widely distributed in humans and animals[17, 18].Infections caused by many human 
coronaviruses (HCoVs) were initially only mild and were thus known as overlooked 
pathogens. Since the onset of extremely pathogenic acute respiratory syndrome, coronavirus 
1 (SARS-CoV-1) (2002 and 2003) and coronavirus (MERS-CoV, 2012)[19], Middle East 
respiratory syndrome[19],it is obvious that coronaviruses can cross the species barrier and 
cause human infections which are life-threatening, thus requiring greater attention than the 
initial HCoVs[20]. Disease of Coronavirus (COVID-19) has been reported by WHO as 
spreading around the world in more than 203 countries, including the Western Pacific, 
Africa, USA, Europe, and South East Asia. It becomes most critical issue and serious disease 
due to extended geographical area, fail to control measures, limited information in human 
epidemiology as well as veterinary, immunity and pathogenesis due to high transmissibility, 
extreme disease and associated mortality, therefore rapid identification and isolation of cases 
in order to contain them has become essential demand [21]. 
For laboratories dealing with specimens of suspectedCOVID-19 patients, effective 
biosafety procedures are of major concern. When specimens from a patient with suspected 
or confirmedCOVID-19 are delivered, clinicians take the responsibility to inform the 
laboratory. This can be achieved by completing forms of paper or electronic test request 
correctly, or by communicating directly with the clinical diagnostic laboratory. Before 
sending specimens to the laboratory, it is possible that clinicians may not have identified 
COVID-19 as a potential diagnosis prior to sending specimens to the laboratory. During 
laboratory work, risk evaluation is very critical. Therefore, for the processing of biological 
specimens from patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19, clinical laboratories must 
carry out their own risk assessments [22]. 
In accordance with the Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) practices and procedures defined for 
the basic laboratory, WHO recommends that all laboratory diagnostic work and PCR analysis 
on clinical specimens from suspected or confirmed individuals of being infected with novel 
coronavirus should be follow this level of safety [23]. 
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Specimen collection  
Appropriate specimen selection, storage , packaging and transport should be authorized 
only by qualified personnel, ensuring that sufficient standard operating procedures are in use 
in compliance with national or WHO guidelines18 and that all specimens should be regarded 
as potentially infectious[21].  
 
Diagnosis 
Suspected cases with nucleic acid amplification tests, such as real -time reverse 
transcription-polymerase chain reaction, should be screened for the virus. (RT-PCR) with 
nucleic acid sequencing confirmation when required. The extraction of viral RNA should be 
performed in a biosafety cabinet in a BSL-2 or similar facility, which will further be used to 
amplify targeted genes, like nucleocapsid (N), RNA polymerase (RdRp) spike (S), envelope 
(E), and RNA-dependent[24]. Serological tests are still under progress, and field surveys can 
help to better understand the epidemic, enforce control measures, and also to understand 
cross-reactivity with other viruses once they become usable. 
 
Risk Assessment 
To define and minimize risks and decide if enhanced biosafety precautions are needed 
based on situational needs, a site-specific and activity-specific risk assessment should be 
performed. The level of containment, equipment for personal protection ( PPE) and the 
administrative, practical work and required engineering monitoring for the proposed research 
are definedvia possible risk of using the biological material (i.e. virus or clinical sample; 
type of sample) and the intended methods in which carried out on the material. In most cases, 
SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted from person to person by precipitation or inhalation of big 
droplets on mucosal surfaces of respiratory tract. Other ways distinguished include touch 
with contaminated objects and aerosol inhalation, reproducing during large volume handling, 
etc.[25].  
 
Working with potentially infectious material 
In order to ensure the occupational safety of our staff in contact with suspected or 
confirmed clinical specimens of COVID-19 cases, it is important to take appropriate 
considerations to ensure that such material is treated in a safe way within laboratories 
properly prepared for research purposes. Any process with the potential to produce small 
particulate aerosols (for example, open tube sample preparation or  overtaxing) must be 
carried out in a Biosafety Class II approved cabinet (BSC). Appropriate physical condition 
for centrifugation, restraint devices (for example, sealed rotors and safety buckets in 
centrifuge) must be utilized. Ideally, following a BSC centrifuge rotors [26]should be loaded 
and unloaded. Any laboratory procedure that produces aerosols and is conducted outside of 
a BSC (or extremely cleaned up suspicious spilling samples, for example) must be carried 
out with mask N95 [27-29]. During lab. procedures, protective equipment should be used by 
laboratory staff (PPE). When leaving the laboratory, PPE must be removed and hygienic 
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procedures, involving hand wash should be obligatory preserved. PPE must have disposable gloves 
and a laboratory coat with long sleeves, ideally elasticated or tailored cuffs. Further steps to 
establish isolated walls between the specimen and the workers, e.g. physical obstacles, such as a 
splash shield, safety cup for centrifuge, surgical or face shield in order to minimize the risk of 
infection in laboratory staff. It is important to be aware that masks or respirators are not an good 
alternative for biological safety cabinet in case high potential risk of aerosols being produced 
during samples processing [22]. An influenza immunization program will also help to provide 
laboratory staff with security and minimize employees' fear of infection in emergency 
situations[21]. 
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التقارير المختبرية توثيق العديد من حاالت اإلصابات باألمراض المعدية ضمن العاملين في هذه المختبرات. حوالي  استطاعتعلى مدى العقود القليلة     
الجزيئات   % من هذه الحاالت يعتقد بكونها مرتبطة ارتباطا مباشرا بالرذاذ الجوي داخل المختبر نتيجة العمل مع عينات من المحتمل ان تكون معدية.80
لجزيئات لة او الصلبة لهذا الرذاذ قد تبقى لفترة طويلة داخل جو المختبر أو قد تنتشر لمسافات بعيدة حيث يتم  استنشاقها بسهولة. يمكن لهذه االصغيرة السائ
من الواجب  بحمايكرون. نتيجة لما سبق أص 5أن تترسب بسهولة على االسطح المختلفة مثل الجلد او انظمة التهوية خصوصا اذا كانت اقطارها اكثر من 
ت ءابعض اإلجرات فعالة ومنتظمة لحماية العاملين في المختبرات باإلضافة الى حماية البيئة أو تقليل انتاج مثل هذا الرذاذ الجوي. اءااتباع خطوات أو إجر 
على من ذلك ضرورية للقيام بالتجارب او المستويات اال P2ت السالمة البايولوجية عند مستوى اءارة  الرذاذ الجوي عندما تكون إجر تتضمن قياس مدى خطو 
مالئمة  المختبرية. في معظم الحاالت, يجب ان تكون معدات السالمة و كافة االجراءات الوقائية متوفرة داخل المختبر وفي جميع االوقات وأن تكون 
(.  من الواجب حماية العاملين في 19روس كوفيد للمستوى المطلوب من السالمة البيولوجية الي عمل مختبري )بما في ذلك العوامل البيولوجية, فاي
ت السالمة الجيدة أصبحت مشخصة لتفادي ضرر إنتشار ءاإجرا . 19المختبرات الذين يتعاملون من عينات مشتبه بها او مؤكدة االصابة بفايروس كوفيد 
ن متبعة من قبل العاملين في المختبرات والمذكورة في االرشادات . من المتوقع إن جميع االجراءات الوقائية القياسية تكو 19العدوى بفيروس سارس كوفيد 
عند التعامل مع العامة للمختبرات والتي تتماشى مع االجراءات القياسية. هذه اإلجراآت القياسية المتعلقة بمتطلبات السالمة البايولوجية يجب أن تطبق 
المختبرات الميكروبيولوجية  والسرسرية التي تتعامل مع عينات الدم ، المصل ، البلغم او .  تشمل هذه اإلجراىت القياسية 19عينات افيروس سارس كوفيد 
 .غيرها من العينات المتعلقة بالبحوث
 
 .19السالمة البايولوجية، الرذاذ الجوي، كوفيد  الكلمات الدالة:
